Clinton, Congress, Bosnia and the Iranians

By: Mary Mostert, Editor, Reagan Information Interchange

May 8, 1996

Editor's Note: The time-line in which Clinton secretly approved the involvement of Iranian nationals and weapons in Bosnia followed his refusal to permit other, non-terrorist, arms suppliers to bring arms into Bosnia. HR 4426, introduced May 16, 1994, by Rep. David Obey (D-Wi), then chairman of the Foreign Operations Subcommittee, contained the following: Section 526 - Authority to Assist Bosnia-Hercegovina. Giving President Clinton the authority to unilaterally provide arms to Bosnia. Clinton signed this bill. However, he refused to do so in spite of an 87-13 vote in favor of a bill, containing Amendment No., 1851, introduced by Sen. Bob Dole, which would "Terminate the United States Arms embargo to the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina.) It required the president to certify to Congress that the arms would be used properly. By approving the introduction of Iranian Terrorists, arms and methods into this conflict, in Europe, Clinton has furthered the power of Iran's Holy War against Christians in Europe.

FOREIGN OPERATIONS, EXPORT FINANCING, AND RELATED AGENCIES
APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 1995 (Senate - June 29, 1994)

AUTHORITY TO ASSIST BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA

Sec. 546. (a) Congress finds as follows:

(1) The United Nations has imposed an embargo on the transfer of arms to any country on the territory of the former Yugoslavia.

(2) The federated states of Serbia and Montenegro have a large supply of military equipment and ammunition and the Serbian forces fighting the government of Bosnia-Hercegovina have more than one thousand battle tanks, armored vehicles, and artillery pieces.

(3) Because the United Nations arms embargo is serving to sustain the military advantage of the aggressor, the United Nations should exempt the government of Bosnia-Hercegovina from its embargo.

(b) Pursuant to a lifting of the United Nations arms embargo, or to a unilateral lifting of the arms embargo by the President of the United States, against Bosnia-Hercegovina , the President is authorized to transfer, subject to the regular notification procedures of the Committees on Appropriations, to the government of that nation, without reimbursement, d efense articles from the stocks of the Department of Defense of an aggregate value not to exceed $50,000,000 in fiscal year 1995: Provided,

That the President certifies in a timely fashion to the Congress that--

(1) the transfer of such articles would assist that nation in self-defense and thereby promote the security and stability of the region; and

(2) United States allies are prepared to join in such a military assistance effort.

(c) Within 60 days of any transfer under the authority provided in subsection (b), and every 60 days thereafter, the President shall report in writing to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate concerning the articles transferred and the disposition thereof.

(d) There are authorized to be appropriated to the President such sums as may be necessary to reimburse the applicable appropriation, fund, or account for defense articles provided under this section.

(e) If the President determines that doing so will contribute to a just resolution of charges regarding genocide or other violations of international law in the former Yugoslavia, the authority of section 552(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, may be used to provide up to $25,000,000 of commodities and services to the United Nations War Crimes Tribunal, without regard to the ceiling limitation contained in paragraph (2) thereof: Provided, That the determination required under this subsection shall be in lieu of any determinations otherwise required under section 552(c).

On May 23, 1994, Rep. Lee H. Hamilton (D-In) entered into the record a response from Secretary of Defense William Perry on "his assessment of the implications and consequences of lifting the arms embargo against Bosnia. The following are excerpts from Secretary Perry's response, giving the Administration's "official" view of lifting the Arms Embargo was not feasible.the report, given

-"Your support of the Administration's position on this issue is crucial. A peaceful settlement in Bosnia will require a multilateral approach. The support of our allies and the United Nations cannot be sustained if we unilaterally lift the embargo. Please know that we remain steadfast in our commitment to a peaceful and viable settlement in that country.

Thank you for your continued attention to this matter. I look forward to working with you on this and other policy issues".

Sincerely,

William J. Perry.

-

>RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ON THE ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST BOSNIA

Question. If the arms embargo against the Bosnian government were unilaterally lifted by the United States, what impact would such a move have on the compliance of other nations with the broad range of UN Security Council-imposed embargoes, such as economic sanctions against Serbia and sanctions against Iraq?

Answer. There is a clear danger that other nations would use the U.S. precedent as a pretext to unilaterally `lift' sanctions regimes that they found inconvenient or opposed for political or economic reasons. This could lead to a total breakdown in the ability of the UN to enforce sanctions against Serbia, Iraq, Libya and Haiti, and over time could limit the power of the UN to affect international behavior through binding resolutions.

Question. Some have argued that the arms embargo against Bosnia is not legally binding, since the embargo was imposed against the former Yugoslavia and Bosnia is not a successor state; and because the embargo violates Bosnia 's right of self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. What is the Administration's legal opinion on this issue?

Answer. The arms embargo was imposed on the territory of the former Yugoslavia by UN Security Council Resolution 713 (1991) and reaffirmed in later resolutions (e.g., Resolutions 724, 727, 740, 743, and 787). Resolution 713 is a mandatory decision under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and expressly provides that the embargo will remain in effect `until the Security Council decides otherwise.' The Council has also made clear that the embargo applies throughout the territory of the former Yugoslavia, notwithstanding its breakup into separate states (see Resolution 727 (1992)). Thus it applies to Bosnia .

The embargo does not violate Bosnia 's right of self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. Any self-defense right that may exist to receive arms from other states under Article 51 is subject to the authority of the Security Council, which may take action affecting it. Thus, under Article 51, measures taken in self-defense `shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the [UN] Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.'

The Security Council may take various actions--imposition of cease-fires, limits on armaments, and establishment of protected or demilitarized zones--that affect a state's right of self-defense. For example, the Council may impose a cease-fire even though its immediate effect may leave an aggressor in temporary occupation of part of the defender's territory. Article 51 takes as its premise the principle that the Security Council may impose such sanctions when it judges them to be necessary, and this is an essential part of the Council's authorities to maintain and restore peace.

Question. How would a unilateral lifting of the arms embargo affect our relations with our NATO Allies and the Russian Federation?

Answer. Our Allies and the Russians are extremely concerned at the prospect of unilateral U.S. lifting of the arms embargo. They would argue that our behavior encouraged an erosion of the UN sanctions regime as an instrument of international policy. If they came to believe that unilateral U.S. lifting of the embargo had more than a symbolic effect, they might decide to pull some or all of their forces out of UNPROFOR, leading to the collapse of the humanitarian relief effort. Sarajevo, Gorazde, Srebrenica and Zepa, which are surrounded by Serb forces, would be cut off from most relief supplies. Should the Bosnian Serbs attack any remaining European forces or take them hostage, the Europeans would hold us accountable. Nations like Iran, who have standing offers to provide troops to the Bosnian government, might elect to do so, arguing that the U.S. had set a precedent for ignoring a UN resolution.

Question. If the arm embargo were lifted, what types of weapons would the Bosnian government forces need to achieve a degree of weapon equivalence with the Bosnian Serb forces? Which nations would train the Bosnian forces with these new weapons?

Answer. We presume that the Bosnian government would require large-caliber heavy weapons to match the capabilities of the Bosnian Serbs. This could include medium and heavy artillery, medium tanks, and long-range anti-tank weapons such as the Tube Launched, Optically Tracked, Anti-Tank Weapons (TOW) System. Personnel familiar with weapons provided, usually the supplier (government or industry), generally train recipients in the use, tactical employment, and maintenance of systems procured. Potential suppliers/trainers span the globe.

Question. How long would it take for heavy weapons to be transported to the Bosnian government forces? What are the various access routes and means of delivery? How vulnerable are these routes to attack by Serb or other hostile forces? How large a military force would it take to guard and maintain these logistical routes?

Answer. If the arms embargo were lifted by UN action and Croatia cooperated, heavy weapons could be brought in Bosnia through Croatian Adriatic ports. It would be difficult to deliver substantial amounts of equipment by air since all major Bosnian government airstrips are within Serb artillery range, and aircraft would be subject to SAM fire. Shipment by sea would require weeks and perhaps months, depending on how long it took the Bosnian government to purchase or otherwise procure the weapons. If the U.S. unilaterally lifted the arms embargo, heavy weapons could not be shipped to Bosnia without a willingness on the part of other nations to violate the UN arms embargo. If Croatia were to cooperate with the U.S. in violating the UN arms embargo, and the Bosnian government were able to purchase or otherwise obtain weapons, arms could begin reaching Bosnia in some weeks or months. It is quite possible that most, if not all, UNPROFOR forces would probably have departed by then, perhaps having had to fight its way out, and would not be available to secure routes for arms imports. The Serbs would naturally take advantage of any lag-time between international lifting of the arms embargo and provision of weapons to the Bosnian government. The incentive for the Serbs to launch an all-out final offensive before their forces were put at a disadvantage would be great Thus the U.S. might have to undertake air striks--in this case, without the participation of our NATO Allies--to help repel new Bosnian Serb aggression.

Question. How long would it take to effectively train the Bosnia government forces to use heavy weapons?

Question. How would the Serbs (or other belligerents) react in that interim period between announcement of lifting and adequate training?

Answer. Any formal lifting of the arms embargo by the UN prior to a peace settlement would give the Serbs an obvious incentive to exploit their current military superiority before foreign arms began to be used effectively by Bosnian forces. Assuming that UNPROFOR stayed in place, its soldiers could face attack by Bosnian Serb forces. The Serbs could also be expected to halt the humanitarian relief effort. While relief could still flow into central Bosnia from the Adriatic coast through Croatia, the Serbs are currently capable of cutting off all land routes into Sarajevo, Gorazde, Zepa and Srebrenica. They could also close Sarajevo and Tuzla airports. The only possibility of supply to these areas would be through air drops. While these might sustain some of the outlying enclaves, they would be insufficient for a city the size of Sarajevo, which has at most a three-week supply of food on hand. In addition, air drop aircraft would be susceptible to anti-aircraft fire. The eastern enclaves and other isolated areas like Maglaj and Bihac would probably fall and Sarajevo would be at serious risk even if the population did not face starvation.

Question. If the arms embargo were lifted against Bosnia , would it also have to be lifted against Croatia since Croatian cooperation is essential for transporting weapons to the Bosnians? What impact would lifting the arms embargo against Croatia have on the situation in Krajina? What is the likely Serb reaction?

Answer. The only reliable way to deliver heavy weapons to Bosnia in large quantities is through croatia. If the UN Security Council lifted the arms embargo against Bosnia alone, Croatia might be permitted (by resolution) to have arms transit its territory. Thanks to the Federation agreement signed in March, relations between the Croatian and Bosnian governments are relatively good. Still, it is likely that weapons bound for Bosnia through Croatia would only reach their final destination if Croatia also received arms either openly or covertly. If the arms embargo were also lifted against Croatia, and the Croats used these weapons against the Krajina Serbs (who currently control almost one third of Croatian territory) it is possible, and perhaps likely, that Serbia proper would intervene, leading to an outbreak of war between Croatia and Serbia. Lifting the embargo against Croatia would also raise questions on whether the embargo should remain in effect against Solvenia Question. Would the lifting of the arms embargo help or hinder efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement to the conflict? Is it an option for future consideration? Under what circumstances?

Answer. Unilateral U.S. lifting of the arms embargo would probably have a chilling effect on the negotiating process. The Bosnian government might feel less inclined to seek a negotiated solution in the hope that it could achieve a better solution on the battlefield. The Bosnian Serbs, for their part, would be less inclined than ever to accept a U.S. mediating role in the conflict, depriving us of the ability to serve as an honest broker for a settlement. If the Serbs perceived an immediate physical threat to themselves as a result of the U.S. decision, they could attack the Bosnian government or UNPROFOR forces or close down the humanitarian relief supply to Sarajevo and the eastern enclaves, thus making a negotiated settlement even more remote.

By playing an "under the table" game with Iran, naturally the Croatians also received their share of the contraband weapons, for permitting passage of some of them to their enemies, the Muslims. This did, in fact, create the very situation Sec. Perry predicted, in which the Croatians attacked the Serbs who owned homes and land Krajina (and had lived in that area for generation.) This resulted in the ethnic cleansing of Krajina with up to 250,000 Serbs fleeing their homes and those remaining being executed. Remember, it was the Croatian Nazis in World War II that killed over 800,000 Serbs - Jews and Gypsies.

ARSON AND DEATH PLAGUE SERBIAN REGION OF CROATIA

By CHRIS HEDGES
c. 1995 New York Times News Service, 9/30/95

KNIN, Croatia Nearly two months after Croatian forces drovemore than 120,000 Serbian troops and civilians from the Krajinaregion of Croatia, Serbian villages continue to burn and an averageof four to six Serbian civilians are found dead each day, sayofficials of the United Nations and the European Union.

The failure by the Croatian government to stem the violence, despite its assurances that the killings and destruction are being carried out by ``renegades,'' has led U.N. officials here to conclude that the attacks are part of a systematic campaign to drive the 3,500 remaining Serbs from the Krajina and prevent those who want to return from coming back.

``Since the August offensive, U.N. patrols have documented a systematic campaign of arson, murder and looting by the Croatian military,'' said Alun R. Roberts, the U.N. press officer in Knin. He said Croatian troops had ``destroyed whole Serb villages, making it impossible for those Serbs who fled to return.

``Our U.N. patrols are continuing to find bodies, usually of elderly Serbs, killed in their homes. Despite repeated requests by the U.N. to the Croatian authorities to intervene, they appear to make little effort, and usually do nothing.''

The killing of elderly Serbs, many of them too weak to flee, has shocked and angered U.N. and European Union monitors here. Many of the victims lived alone in abandoned hamlets, where they would be visited by aid workers bringing food. In recent weeks many have been found dead, usually with a single bullet wound in the head.

Earlier this month, Croatian special forces made a sweep through the largely deserted Plavno Valley, where some 40 Serbian hamlets lie abandoned or in ruins. U.N. peacekeepers following the sweep found two elderly men dead, one shot in the back of the head and the other with his throat cut. The next day, the United Nations found three more elderly Serbs killed, including a 90-year-old woman.

``Evidence of atrocities, an average of six corpses a day, continues to emerge,'' says the latest European Union rights report. ``The corpses, some fresh, some decomposed, are mainly old men. Many have been shot in the back of the head or had throats slit. Others have been mutilated. Isolated pockets of elderly civilians report people gone missing or detained.''

Only about 100 of the more 120,000 Serbs who fled have returned to the Krajina, and most of those have slipped into the area without official permission, U.N. officials said. Those who try to return through the Croatian government office in Belgrade are rarely given permission, these officials said.

``As far as we can see, the Croatian office in Belgrade is quite purposely dysfunctional,'' one European Union official said. ``The object is to keep the Serbs out.''

The Serbs who remain live in terror, often fleeing to the hills when cars carrying marauding Croats come into their villages.

``A few days after the Croats came, I found my 95-year-old father with his throat slashed,'' said Pajic Petar, a Serb who lives in the village of Zorici, about 15 miles north of Knin. ``We buried him with another old man who was murdered. Each day the soldiers come and take more of our animals and our belongings, telling us to shut up or we will die.''

DATE=9/21/95
NUMBER=2-185704
TITLE= CROATIA/REFUGEES
BYLINE= KYLE KING

ZAGREB: U-N REFUGEE COMMISSION OFFICIALS SAY THE CROATIAN GOVERNMENT HAS RECENTLY EXPELLED SEVERAL GROUPS OF BOSNIANS WHO HAD TRIED TO TAKE REFUGEE IN CROATIA.

MUSLIM REFUGEES WERE SENT TO THE BOSNIAN-MUSLIM TOWN OF BIHAC, WHILE HUNDREDS OF BOSNIAN-CROAT REFUGEES WERE REPORTEDLY SHIPPED OFF TO THE TOWN OF GLAMOC.

U-N OFFICIALS SAY THEY HAVE PROTESTED THE CROATIAN ACTIONS, BUT THEY SAY AT LEAST TWO FURTHER INSTANCES OF REFUGEES FORCED BACK INTO BOSNIA HAVE BEEN REPORTED SINCE FOREIGN MINISTER MATE GRANIC PROMISED THEY WOULD BE STOPPED.

MEANWHILE, U-N OFFICIALS HAVE AGAIN ACCUSED THE CROATIAN GOVERNMENT OF MISTREATING THE FEW REMAINING SERBS WHO STAYED BEHIND WHEN THE ARMY RE-TOOK THE KRAJINA REGION IN AUGUST.

SPOKESMAN ALEXANDER IVANKO SAYS CROATIAN AUTHORITIES ARE ALSO HINDERING U-N MONITORS TRYING TO OBSERVE WHAT IS HAPPENING.

Into this mixture of hate, Clinton introduced, through his covert decision, kept secret from the people and the Congress of the United States a nation which Congress had found:

IRAN 'S ACTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM- The Congress makes the following findings, based on the records of the Department of State, with respect to Iran 's acts of international terrorism:

XXX> And now? The Iranian terrorists are still there. They have taught their co-religionists in Bosnia their trade - how to make terrorist bombs. They, and the bombs, and the hate for American by the Iranian extremists on one hand, and, undoubtedly, now that the story is out, the hatred for Americans by the Serbs who find that the world's only superpower was cooperating under the table with those who tried in World War II to annihilate the Serbs. With the help of the Iranian terrorists - perhaps, when the Americans leave, they will be able to accomplish their goal.

TIME International

February 26, 1996 Volume 147, No. 9

WITH MALICE TOWARD ALL

AS EACH FACTION IN BOSNIA VIOLATES THE DAYTON PACT, THE PEACEMAKERS ALREADY HAVE HEIR HANDS FULL

by Bruce W. Nelan
"Every side is violating one or more provisions of the agreement. The Bosnian Muslims were holding Serbs they had promised to release; the Bosnian Serbs broke off high-level talks with peacekeeping forces; and the Croats were refusing to cooperate with the Muslims, their purported federation partners, in the divided city of Mostar. "The parties will not be allowed," warned State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns, "to choose which parts of the agreement they like and which they do not."

If Izetbegovic was hesitant early in the week, he later had more reason to be. On Thursday, NATO troop raided a former ski chalet about 40 km west of Sarajevo. There they captured 11 men, including three Iranians, in the midst of an arsenal of terrorist weapons--explosives, grenades, sniper rifles, booby-trapped toys and a picture of Ayatullah Khomeini. They also found sketches of facilities used by the Implementation Force (IFOR) and plans for kidnapping a Serb liaison officer.

Whatever was going on in the chalet, it was a violation of the accords, beginning with the fact that all foreign fighters except IFOR troops were required to leave Bosnia last month. The presence of the Iranians--later passed off as "foreign instructors" by the Bosnian government--was clearly troubling. So too was the fact that the other men present at the chalet were officials of the Bosnian Interior Ministry.

Even before the chalet raid, the Bosnians had been under diplomatic scrutiny. In three recent incidents, government troops arrested at least 10 Bosnian Serbs who wandered into their territory near Sarajevo. The men were not among those indicted by the special U.N. war-crimes tribunal in the Hague. While there have been a number of stories about "mass graves," as reported by wire services, "proving" that the Serbs had killed thousands, one of the photographs which was printed in thousands of newspapers around the world to "prove" mass killing at Srebrenica was obviously a fake. There was a skull, with socket eyes, posed, obviously by the photographer, next to torn military battle clothing. A mass grave had been found near Srebrenica. But, whose mass grave. We called the Holocaust Museum to ask about the mass graves left by the Nazis in World War II when they killed, according to the Holocaust Museum figures, a total of 800,000 non-Jews. In 1941, their figures show, 100,000 Christians and Jews were killed "by Gestapo organized Moslem bands" in Bosnia. This creates another problem, according to NATO Officials: " When the tribunal's investigators in Bosnia begin digging up mass graves in the spring, they will become what a NATO official calls "prime targets," and NATO will do its best to guarantee their safety.

Reported by Dean Fischer/Washington, Thomas Sancton/Paris and Alexandra Stiglmayer/Sarajevo
The first question the Congressional Special Investigation, approved today in Congress should ask: WHY? Why when the American Navy was patrolling the seas to prevent our friends from selling arms to the Bosnians - did he encourage the Iranians to be the ones to get through the embargo to introduce terrorism to Bosnia?


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